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Introduction
Marine pollution is a large environmental problem in many parts of the world, and
affects both developed and developing countries. Different degradable and non-
degradable emissions threaten marine resources and marine biodiversity and,
ultimately, the health of marine ecosystems (GPA, 1995; Elmgren, 2001). Large
overloads of nutrients are one of many stresses on coastal and marine ecosystems
(Gabric & Bell, 1993; Turner et al., 1999; Rabalais, 2000). The growing world
population and the associated intensification of agricultural production has led to
nutrient enrichment in marine waters over the last decades (Forsberg, 1994; Turner
et al., 1999). The spatial distribution of the world population also influences
nutrient loads; for example, urbanization has led to a larger outflow of nutrients
from ecosystems on land to the aquatic environment. Furthermore, the bulk of the
world￿s population lives in coastal areas, and there is a continuing trend towards its
concentration in these regions, which further explains the pressure on coastal and
marine ecosystems (GPA, 1995).
It is very likely that nutrient loads will keep on increasing over the next decades.
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
the world population is expected to rise by 30% until 2030, and this increase will
occur almost exclusively in urban areas. The increase in world population makes
higher food production necessary. Historically, higher food production has been
achieved though rapid intensification of agricultural production; for example,
nitrogen fertilizer consumption has increased eight-fold in the last four decades,
while per hectare yields of wheat and rice have doubled. Unless substantial action
is taken, environmental damage caused by nutrient over-enrichment is therefore
likely to remain or increase.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how the characteristics of large-scale
marine pollution problems affect policy decisions. Marine pollution is usually
characterized by multiple, heterogeneous emission sources located in different
countries. The properties of the marine recipient vary between different basins, and
between coastal areas and the open sea. Multiple, and sometimes interactive,
pollutants contribute to degradation of the seas￿ ecosystems. I investigate how
these attributes affect the total costs of abatement and the allocation of abatement
efforts between sources, countries and pollutants. There is also considerable
uncertainty about natural and economic processes that influence marine
ecosystems. I analyze how uncertainty about pollutant transports and abatement
costs affects decisions regarding total abatement and the allocation of abatement
between countries. The four empirical applications are made to the Baltic Sea,
which a semi-enclosed, regional sea in Northern Europe, severely degraded by
eutrophication. However, the concepts used are likely to be relevant also for the
management of other regional seas.
The thesis is organized as follows; first, a brief introduction to marine pollution
problems in general is given. In the next chapter, the economics of marine
pollution is discussed and the literature on water management is reviewed. A12
chapter that presents the main findings in the thesis follows this. Finally, the
conclusions are presented.
Sources and environmental effects of marine pollution
Excessive nutrient loads to coastal waters lead to eutrophication. The symptoms of
eutrophication are several: increased turbidity of waters; harmful and even toxic
algae blooms; oxygen deficiency in bottom sediments; and changes in biodiversity
and hence in the very basic conditions for the marine ecosystems (Gabric & Bell,
1993). Scientific studies have shown that the economic value of reduced
eutrophication of marine waters can be large (S￿derqvist, 1996; Markovska and
Zylicz, 1999).
Much of the nutrient pollution that reaches coastal waters originates from
economic activities taking place at a considerable distance from the coast, either
within the drainage basin or outside it (Turner et al., 1999). The emissions come
from agricultural sources, households and municipal and industrial point sources
and from combustion of fossil fuels. Many of these sources are non-point sources,
where the link between a given emission source and loads to the sea is difficult or
even impossible to establish. Most of the emissions are transported from the
sources to coastal waters via rivers in the drainage basin, with ocean currents and
through the atmosphere, while smaller amounts are deposited directly into the
recipient.
Eutrophication of marine waters is linked in several ways to other environmental
and resource issues. The pollutants that cause eutrophication contribute also to
other environmental problems. In many parts of the world, high nutrient loads from
agricultural areas are associated with high levels of nitrate in groundwater
(Lundqvist & Falkenmark, 2000). Moreover, nitrogen oxide emissions from
combustion of fossil fuels increase the atmospheric deposition of nitrogen on land
and seas and, thereby, contribute to both eutrophication and acidification of lakes
and soils. Nutrients that reach coastal waters affect marine resources, such as fish
stocks. The direction of the impact depends on the characteristics of each species
and the interdependencies between different fish populations (Lee, Jones & Jones,
1991; Elmgren, 2001). When observations have shown that fish stocks decline,
long-standing controversies regarding the relative importance of pollution and
over-exploitation for the decline has slowed down action, even when the situation
has become critical. Other environmental problems, such as global warming, can
indirectly affect eutrophication processes as these processes depend on both
climate and weather (Elmgren, 2001).
Characteristics of marine pollution problems
Large-scale marine pollution is usually associated with complex physical
relationships involving several coupled ecosystems, high variability, multiple
conflicting objectives and multiple decision-makers (Grigg, 1996). In general,
management of water pollution requires an analysis of the different pollutant
pathways and the costs of abatement at all different emission sources (Baumol &13
Oates, 1988; Segerson, 1988). However, empirical information on pollutant
transports and costs is usually hard to find (see e.g. Shoemaker, Ervin and Caswell,
1993). When it comes to large-scale marine pollution, the difficulties to obtain
good and consistent data are large. Baseline data on e.g. emissions from different
types of sources, the number of emission sources, and loads and concentrations of
pollutants are often uncertain estimates (see e.g. St￿lnacke, 1996; EEA, 2001).
There are complex links between pollutants and abatement technologies. In many
cases, several different pollutants can be affected by a single abatement technology
(Milon, 1987; Gren, Elofsson and Jannke, 1997). Also, if one abatement measure
is introduced, this may influence the efficiency of other abatement technologies, for
example if one measure is located upstream while the other is located downstream.
The final costs of emission reductions are not known with certainty when policies
are decided upon, due to unpredictable technological development, uncertainty
about baseline data on the use of technologies and indirect effects on non-polluting
sectors.
The dynamics of marine aquifers and their response to changes in pollutant loads
are often poorly understood (Turner et al., 1999; Tyrrell, 1999), and difficulties to
determine these physical relationships is rather a common characteristic of large-
scale marine pollution problems (Gabric & Bell, 1993; Musu, 1997). One reason
for the difficulties to quantify these links is that many aquifers consist of several,
interdependent basins that differ with regard to their physical and bio-chemical
properties. Also, the properties of coastal regions usually differ substantially from
those of the open sea. Due to this heterogeneity, the environmental damage caused
by pollution varies throughout the water-body. Adding to this, pollutants can
interact in different ways during the transport or in the aquifer, and the time for the
aquifer to adjust to changes in loads can differ between pollutants (see e.g.
St￿lnacke, 1996; Turner et al., 1999).
Pollutant transports and transformations cannot be predicted with certainty. Both
on the way from the sources to the recipient and in the recipient itself, pollutant
transports and transformations are stochastic due to variations in weather and other
natural processes. Abatement measures can differ with regard to their sensitivity to
random processes in the environment. Moreover, if one abatement activity is
located upstream, while another is located downstream, this can either increase or
reduce the total variability depending on the links between the stochastic processes.
When the spatial scale of the pollution problem is larger, the variability associated
with a particular abatement measure can differ between regions. Also, the
variability of processes in the aquifer itself is a more complex issue to analyze if
the aquifer is large than if it is small, because larger aquifers are generally more
heterogeneous than are small ones.
The level of spatial aggregation for analysis of large-scale water pollution is not
immediately obvious. Policy decision-making does not follow the same
geographical boundaries as pollution problems. This implies that policy-makers
have to take into account that it is not always possible to differentiate policies
between regions with different impact on water quality. When several regions with
different policy decision units contribute to the same pollution problem, strategic
considerations may affect policy decisions. Further, when policy decisions are14
taken at national or international level, several different policy areas, with smaller
or larger impact on emissions, can be endogenous to the policymaker, and there
can be structural impacts on non-polluting sectors from large abatement programs
(see e.g. Johannesson & Rand￿s, 2000). There are numerous governmental and
other agencies at different levels that are involved in policy-making and
enforcement (Shortle, 1996; Eckerberg, 1997). Coordination of policies and
enforcement across different levels of governments, sectors and regions is therefore
a cumbersome task. Often it is not obvious where the ultimate responsibility for
pollution control lies. Finally, data on costs for reducing emissions are usually
available for administrative regions, such as municipalities, counties and nations,
while data on nutrient transports refer to watersheds. Therefore, the choice of
spatial aggregation and the number of sectors and decision-makers to include in an
analysis requires that a trade-off be made between detail in modeling, consistency
of data, and relevance with regard to policy-making.
Similarly as for most environmental problems, the economic value of reduced
pollution is not easily quantified. Estimates of people￿s willingness to pay depend
on how researchers describe the effects of pollution reductions to the respondents.
S￿derqvist￿s  (1998) study suggests that people have very high confidence in the
scenarios presented by researcher, and that few respondents doubt the calculations
presented. Gaps in scientific knowledge and the role of stochastic processes may
not be fully recognized by the respondents in such a study. When several countries
are involved, there can be difficulties in comparing studies across countries, and
when only few studies are made, it is not self-evident what rule should be applied
when extrapolating the results to other countries (cf. S￿derqvist, 1996; Markovska
& Zylicz, 1999).  Moreover, seas and coastal regions are used for multiple
purposes; for professional and sport fishing, for bathing and recreation and as a
pollutant sink. Many people may also consider the ecosystem itself valuable.
Estimating these values separately may lead to the wrong conclusions, as the
different uses may be complements or substitutes to the users.
As noted above, marine pollution often involves several countries, and it is
known from the economic literature that countries that pollute a common natural
resource may prefer not to cooperate on abatement, in spite of cooperation being a
socially preferred outcome (M￿ler, 1989; Barrett, 1994). The reason is that each
country can be better off if it abstains from abatement while still being able to
benefit from abatement in other countries. Decisions in a single country regarding
abatement of emissions to a common sea may also be affected by the difficulties to
verify ex post whether other countries stick to an abatement agreement, because of
the difficulties to measure emissions and loads.
Economics of marine pollution
Economics is not the only scientific discipline that tries to find explanations for and
remedies to the degradation of marine ecosystems. However, it contributes to the
understanding of the problem by linking choices made by societies, individuals and
firms to the corresponding impact on the marine environment.15
In this chapter, I first describe economic explanations for pollution. This is
followed by a review of literature on water management. At the end of the chapter,
I try to identify gaps in knowledge regarding large-scale water pollution.
The theory of externalities and government intervention
The standard economic explanation for pollution is that firms and individuals take
their production and consumption decisions without fully considering the effects
that these decisions have on others￿ utility or production (Baumol & Oates, 1988).
Pollution is therefore an ￿externality￿ that some agents impose on others.
In a situation where if one party makes use of a natural resource, then this affects
all other parties, there are reciprocal externalities (see e.g. Dasgupta, M￿ler &
Vercelli, 1997). Reciprocal externalities are typical for common property resources
such as seas, lakes, fisheries, the atmosphere, forests and grazing lands. The
situation with reciprocal externalities differs from a situation where externalities
are unilateral. With unilateral externalities, if one agent makes use of the natural
resource, this affects other agents, but the actions of these other agents have no
impact on the first agent. One example of a unilateral externality is acid rain caused
by people in one country but affecting people in another (M￿ler, 1989). Another
one is when a country upstream of an international river takes decisions, from
which it reaps all the benefits but carry only a small fraction of the costs in terms of
pollution or changed water-flow (see e.g. Linnerooth-Bayer and Murcott, 1996).
It is well known from economic theory that when there are reciprocal
externalities and the users do not cooperate in some way, common property
resources are over-exploited (Hardin, 1968). However, both theory and empirical
evidence show that non-cooperation and over-exploitation is not inevitable, but
that cooperation is possible under many circumstances (Becker & Ostrom, 1995;
Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). Costs of monitoring, enforcement and information and
preferences for the welfare of future generations are some of the factors that
determine whether and how cooperative management develops.
An underlying cause of externalities is the absence of well-defined property
rights. Coase (1960) showed that with well-defined property rights, zero bargaining
cost, few polluters and few victims, the agents can solve the pollution problem
without intervention from governments and the resulting resource allocation will be
optimal. However, the major environmental problems today, such as climate
change, large-scale water pollution and biodiversity loss, do not fit these simple
characteristics. Instead, property rights are ill defined, there are large numbers of
pollutants and victims and it is nearly impossible to trace down all affected agents.
Bargaining costs would be enormous, and hence markets that solve these problems
do not arise spontaneously. Such market failure leads to inefficient resource use.
In the presence of market failure, government intervention can increase welfare
and make everyone better off through the introduction of economic incentives that
restore an optimal resource allocation. Pigou (1920) showed that an efficient
resource allocation could be achieved through the introduction of a so-called
Pigouvian tax on pollution. An extensive body of literature explores the use of16
economic instruments for water pollution and shows that the choice of policy
instrument can be a complicated issue when pollutant fate is complex and non-
point sources are involved (see e.g. Beavis and Walker, 1979, 1983; Segerson,
1988; Shortle, 1990; Malik, Letson & Crutchfield, 1993; Hoag and Hughes-Popp,
1997; Archer and Shogren, 2001).
However, governments do not always act to reduce emissions. Instead,
government policies in policy areas other than the environmental have contributed
to degradation of marine resources. Subsidies to the agricultural sector have led to
intensified crop production that has increased runoff of nutrients and pesticide
residues to the aquatic environment in many parts of the world. Also, countries
have in many cases failed to agree on policies for fishery, with over-fishing as a
consequence. Lack of coordination between the large numbers of different
governmental agencies involved in water management is often an obstacle to an
efficient allocation of abatement between pollutants, sectors and regions (see e.g.
Hjorth, 1996; Grigg, 1996; Eckerberg, 1997; Turner et al., 1999).
As noted above, a fully informed, unselfish social planner can, hypothetically,
increase welfare through the introduction of suitable economic instruments that
reduce pollution. However, in many cases, governments do not even undertake
reforms that would benefit all affected agents (Stiglitz, 1998). One reason for such
government failure is there can be uncertainty about the direct consequences of the
reform. Another reason is that governments cannot commit to a given policy and
those affected by the policy know that it can be followed by further reforms in the
future. Even if the policy suggested is beneficial to all, there is a risk that the future
reforms, to which the policy might lead, can be disadvantageous to certain groups.
Moreover, even if there are many reforms that would be beneficial for everyone,
such reforms may be complicated. This can be an obstacle, as it requires high
efforts from governments and the public to obtain all the knowledge necessary to
evaluate such a reform. Instead, simplicity is often required for a reform to be
politically appealing. If it is necessary that reforms are both simple and acceptable
to all affected agents, then the set of feasible policies may not be very large.
Literature on economics of water management
Empirical literature on the economics of marine management is sparse, while the
literature on water quality management in general is abundant. The aim of the
following review is to investigate how the spatial scale has influenced studies of
water management. The review starts with an attempt to identify a ￿basic
approach￿ to water management. Then, different extensions to this basic approach
are reviewed. Finally, the gaps in the literature are discussed, while comparing the
literature to the description of the characteristics of marine pollution in the
preceding chapter.
The basic approach
Firstly, it seems to be possible to identify a basic approach in applied analysis of
water pollution. This basic approach assumes the existence of a social planner,17
whose objective it is to either maximize aggregate producer profits or minimize
total costs subject to a restriction on the loads of a single pollutant (Braden et al.
1989; Johnsen, 1993; Russel & Shogren, 1993; Paaby et al., 1996; Yiridoe &
Weersink, 1998). The analysis is static and often only one or two economic sectors
are included, typically the agricultural sector and wastewater treatment plants. The
research effort associated with these studies is mainly spent on the investigation of
abatement costs at different sources and of the different pollutant pathways.
Some of the studies model agricultural crop production and pollutant transports
in high detail (e.g. Braden et al., 1989; Yiridoe & Weersink, 1998). While
modeling crop production in detail, these authors are able to calculate costs from
changes in nutrient application, cropping pattern and management measures within
a coherent framework. Braden et al. (1989) differs from most applied studies by
letting the externality ￿ erosion in this case ￿ enter not only the pollution constraint
but also the crop production function.
Johnsen (1993) and Paaby et al. (1996) extend the scale of the study to the
national level. Paaby et al. (1996) develop a model of agricultural production,
including both crop and livestock production as well as wastewater treatment
plants. Johnsen investigates the cost-effectiveness of phosphorus reduction
measures in the Norwegian agricultural sector. When extending the analysis to
national scale, both Johnsen (1993) and Paaby et al. (1996) suggest that abatement
costs should be calculated both as private and social costs. An underlying
presumption is that other policies than the environmental is endogenous to the
policy-maker. Both Johnsen (1993) and Paaby et al. (1996) use world market
prices for agricultural products in order to calculate social costs. Paaby et al.
(1996) also adjust the discount rate. The studies illustrate the difficulties associated
with the translation of private into social costs in such a model. It is unclear how
the social cost approach should be applied consistently throughout a cost-
effectiveness study. Not only agricultural markets are regulated, but also for
example labor markets, and the opportunity cost of labor is likely to influence cost
estimates. Moreover, wastewater treatment plants, included in Paaby et al. (1996),
are publicly owned, and it is not immediately obvious how the social cost should
be calculated, and accordingly, such calculations are avoided by the authors.
Gren, Elofsson & Jannke (1997) and van der Veeren & Tol (2001) extend the
analysis of water pollution management to a larger international watershed. Gren,
Elofsson & Jannke (1997) analyze cost-effective reductions in nitrogen and
phosphorus loads to the Baltic Sea. Both the agricultural sector, wastewater
treatment plants, stationary combustion plants and the transport sector are included.
Notably, Gren, Elofsson & Jannke (1997) differs from other studies in this review
by including not only pollutant transports in water but also airborne emissions. Van
der Veeren & Tol (2001) make similar calculations for waterborne nitrogen loads
from the agricultural sector and wastewater treatment sector to the river Rhine.
The major advantage of the small-scale studies is that they permit tailoring
empirical models to local conditions. For empirical large-scale studies, detail in the
modeling of technological relationships is usually sacrificed due to difficulties to
obtain consistent data and the need to aggregate data over large regions in order to
keep the model tractable. However, if environmental damage is caused by large-18
scale pollution, then extending the scale of the study also has advantages. Cost-
effectiveness then requires that all polluting countries and sources are evaluated
simultaneously and that inter-regional pollutant transports are included. This can
only be done when including all emission sources that contribute to environmental
damage. One can also note that Johnsen (1993), Paaby et al. (1996), Gren,
Elofsson & Jannke (1997) and van der Veeren & Tol (2001) all, more or less
directly, derive the need for nutrient reductions from the international agreements
for the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Van der Veeren & Tol (2001) and Paaby et
al. (1996) both translate these agreements into national targets by assuming that the
50% reductions for the North and Baltic Seas can be translated into 50%
reductions for the river Rhine and for Denmark respectively. However, a cost-
effective allocation of abatement between regions is likely to imply different
reduction targets for different regions.
The basic approach to water management is extended in several directions. There
is a relatively large literature that investigates the role of uncertainty and of
dynamics in nutrient transports and transformation. A smaller body of literature
assesses the role of multiple pollutants, links between pollution and the marine
ecosystem and structural effects of policies to reduce pollution.
Uncertainty about pollutant transports
Uncertainty about the relationship between abatement at the emission sources and
the corresponding impact on water quality has achieved a good deal of attention in
the literature. Under uncertainty, the allocation on abatement between sources
cannot be determined from a comparison of expected marginal abatement costs
(Shortle, 1990). Also, it is not obvious how the dual, or cost-effectiveness, problem
should be formulated, but several researchers suggest that it is useful to formulate
the dual as a cost-minimization problem subject to probabilistic constraints
(Shortle, 1990; Horan, 2001). Charnes and Cooper (1963) originally developed
methods for optimization under probabilistic constraints in the 1960s, and their
approach is used for a relatively large number of empirical studies on water
pollution policy. For those applications, it is presumed that the decision-maker
takes into account not only expected loads but also standard deviation of loads.
Thereby, reductions in pollutant loads have to be larger compared to when
uncertainty is ignored, in order to create a safety margin. An underlying
assumption is, generally, that damages are convex in pollutant loads. The
conclusions from these chance-constrained models depend also on assumptions
about the distribution of emissions, see e.g. Xu, Prato & Zhu (1996) and Gren,
Destouni & Tempone (2000). Common to the papers that use chance constraints is
that much of the detail in the modeling of agricultural production has been
sacrificed.
Several studies investigate how differences in uncertainty between different
abatement options affect total costs and the allocation between measures.
McSweeney & Shortle (1990) apply a chance-constrained model to nitrogen losses
from a representative farm, assuming that mean and standard deviation of nitrogen
runoff differ between crops and management systems. A number of papers focus
on the optimal allocation between point and non-point source abatement when non-19
point sources emissions are stochastic and point source emissions are not (Shortle,
1990; Letson, 1992; Malik, Letson & Crutchfield, 1993).
The subject of variability of measures is extended by Kim & Hostetler (1991),
that include a single abatement measure in a dynamic model with chance
constraints. Milon (1987) includes several pollutants; nitrogen, phosphorus and
pesticides, and probabilistic constraints on both surface and groundwater loads.
Similarly to McSweeney & Shortle (1990), Kim & Hostetler (1991) and Milon
(1987) both assume that nitrogen runoff depends on the choice of crops. Bystr￿m,
Andersson & Gren (2000) analyze the implication of having one upstream and one
downstream abatement measure, when the stochastic behavior of these measures is
interdependent. The upstream measure is the choice of agricultural crops, while the
downstream measure is wetland creation.
Other studies take into account the spatial aspect of the problem and allow for
differences in stochastic processes both between abatement measures and regions.
Gren et al. (2000a) include both upstream and downstream measures and loads to
four different, inter-linked coastal basins with separate load targets. Ellis (1987)
incorporates several random parameters and several probabilistic constraints in a
purely theoretical model where the choice variable is the BOD removal rate at
different river segments and each constraint is a restriction on pollutant load
reaching a given section of the river.
Dynamics of nutrient transports and ecosystem response
Several authors analyze the dynamics of pollutant transports and of ecosystem
response. Assessments of the role of nutrient dynamics are generally confined to a
single pollutant. Including both spatial aspects and dynamics, Fleming & Adams
(1997) analyze how the introduction of a fertilizer tax affects ground-water nitrate
pollution and Goetz & Zilbermann (2000) investigate theoretically the regulation
of phosphorus runoff from agricultural land. Hart (2002) compares the effects of
upstream and downstream abatement measures on coastal water pollutant
concentrations when emission pathways are complex and subject to time delays.
While disposing of the spatial aspects, Naevdal (2001) and M￿ler, Xepapadeas
& de Zeeuw (2000) investigate the impact of nutrient loads on water quality in
eutrophicated shallow lakes, with a focus on threshold effects in the aquifer. Hart
& Brady (2002) compare how different targets for water quality in the Baltic Sea
affect the cost-effective abatement path, while including a detailed model of
agricultural production and nutrient dynamics, but avoiding spatial disaggregation.
In a bioeconomic model of Black Sea fishery, Knowler, Barbier & Strand (2001)
show that nutrient load reductions would increase fish catches and lead to
substantial economic benefits for fishers, provided that abatement does not lead to
a radical shift in the behavior of the ecosystem.
Multiple targets and multiple pollutants
Gren, Elofsson & Jannke (1997) and Milon (1987) both include more than one
pollutant, while taking into account joint costs of abatement. The results show that20
the importance of economies of scope depends on the choice of abatement target.
Contrary to those, Connor, Perry & Adams (1995) suggest that there can be
diseconomies of scope when there is a need both to control erosion and nutrient
runoff from irrigated agricultural production. Milon (1987) and Archer & Shogren
(2001) investigate models where pollutants pass through both ground- and surface
water and where different constraints are used for those recipients.  The papers
show that when several receptor points are included, this can have large effects on
the optimal allocation of abatement and the choice of policy instrument.
Structural effects of abatement
The economic effects of policies aimed at pollution reduction need not be confined
to the polluting sectors, but interdependencies between polluting and non-polluting
sectors may spread the impact. Bargur, Davis & Lofting (1971) analyze policies for
local pollution control when emissions come from several, interdependent
industries and pollutants are non-uniformly dispersing in the recipient. Later
studies, where large-scale structural effects are examined, do not include pollutant
transports. Johannesson & Rand￿s (2000) develop a multi-country CGE-model for
the Baltic Sea region, and conclude that in countries, where the polluting sectors
are small relative to the total economy, nutrient load reductions have a small
structural impact on non-polluting sectors. However, if the polluting sectors are
large compared to the total economy, structural impacts can be large. Wier &
Hasler (1999) confirm this conclusion: in Denmark, where the agricultural sector
accounts for approximately 5% of total output, increased exports and
intensification of agricultural production mainly drive the large increase in nitrogen
emissions from Denmark between the 1960s and the 1980s. Structural changes
have had minor effects on Danish emissions during the same time period.
Multiple decision-makers
The international aspects of marine water pollution is a little researched area. A
paper by Gren (2001) illustrates the difficulties to reach an agreement on
international pollution reductions for the Baltic Sea. As suggested by Barrett
(1994), a socially better outcome may be achieved if there is a possibility to make
international financial transfers. In line with this, Markovska & Zylicz (1999)
investigate a cost-sharing scheme for the countries in the Baltic Sea region.
Gaps in knowledge regarding large-scale water pollution
There is a considerable body of literature regarding the economics of small-scale
water pollution, in particular as regards the interdependencies between abatement
technologies and the spatial, dynamic and stochastic aspects of pollutant transports.
Also, multiple receptor points are included in several models.
The methods that have been used for small-scale water pollution have in many
cases been applied also for large-scale pollution. There is, however, little work
done as regards the dynamics of large-scale pollution, probably due to limited
scientific knowledge about the behavior of seas and coastal ecosystems. Few large-
scale studies take into account heterogeneity of the aquifer and the physical links21
between pollutants and marine resources such as fish. Also, few models that
include multiple receptor points, such as for example targets for different basins
have been found. No models that include targets for both coastal areas and over-
polluted groundwater or inland surface water are available.
The role of the complex organizational framework for water pollution policy-
making and enforcement is little investigated. For example, the delegation of
responsibilities to governments at different levels, and timing of decisions by
different authorities have not been examined. In many countries, different interest
groups play an important role for the formation and enforcement of policies, but
there is little research done regarding the influence that these groups have on
policies against marine pollution.
Little research is done that investigates the international aspects of large-scale
water pollution and the associated prospects for cooperation or coalition formation.
International cooperation regarding climate change and airborne emissions, such as
CFCs and acidifying substances, have achieved far more attention in this regard
than have water pollution and it is not unlikely that the issues differ in many
aspects.
Common to both small- and large-scale water pollution issues is that although
uncertainty about nutrient transports is much analyzed, there is little work done
regarding the links between different stochastic processes. These links can have a
potentially large role for policy decisions regarding both total abatement and the
allocation of measures. There is also a lack of knowledge regarding the
implications of pollutant interaction and of the links between pollution and
environmental damage.
The aim of this thesis is to fill some of the gaps in knowledge regarding
management of large-scale water pollution. The particular issues that are treated
are described in the next chapter.
Main findings
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the knowledge about policies for
reducing marine pollution. This is made with the help of economic models with
high relevance for empirical policy considerations.
The costs of pollution reductions are a common theme of the thesis. In three of
the four included studies, cost-effective reductions in nutrient loads are
investigated. These studies show how the minimum total cost is affected by spatial
differences in costs and nutrient transports, stochastic nutrient loads, and nutrient
interaction. In the fourth study, I analyze whether cost uncertainty provides a
rationale for a country to undertake unilateral abatement in order to encourage
another country to follow.
The results illustrate how total abatement is affected by the inclusion of two
different types of uncertainty; that about nutrient loads and that about abatement
costs. Also, they show how the allocation of abatement between measures, regions22
and nutrients is affected by abatement costs, nutrient transports, nutrient interaction
and uncertainty.
All four studies included in the thesis are applied to nutrient emissions to the
Baltic Sea, which is a regional sea, located in Northern Europe, and severely
degraded by eutrophication. However, the concepts and issues are likely to be
relevant also for the management of other regional seas.
This chapter proceeds as follows; first, models, assumptions and limitations in
the studies are briefly described; then, the Baltic Sea, to which the studies are
applied, is described. This is followed by a discussion of the main findings in each
of the four studies included in the thesis. The first article is an analysis of cost-
effective reductions in agricultural nitrogen loads to the Baltic Sea, when costs and
nutrient transports differ between the regions that surround the Sea. The second
extends this analysis to investigate how inter-annual variations in loads affect the
cost-effective solution. The third article discusses the role of nutrient interaction
and sea currents for a cost-effective abatement program. Finally, the fourth article
investigates whether unilateral abatement is beneficial in a situation where it
reduces uncertainty about abatement costs.
Models, assumptions and limitations
In articles I-III, a cost-effectiveness approach is used. Cost-effectiveness studies
are widely used in empirical research on environmental problems. Generally, for
such studies it is assumed that there is an international decision-maker, whose
objective it is to reach a given environmental target at minimum cost. One
advantage with this approach is that it is possible to evaluate, for a given target, the
role of different parameters and processes for the minimum cost and corresponding
allocation of abatement, without knowing the economic value of the environmental
damages from pollution (Baumol & Oates, 1988). For most environmental
problems, these economic values are little known and difficult to quantify. Yet
another reason for using exogenous environmental targets in this thesis is that there
are international agreements on nutrient load reductions to the Baltic Sea. Article
IV differs from the other three articles by modeling the problem as a two-country
game, where each country seeks to maximize its own net benefits. The reason for
using a utility maximization framework in IV is that the role of cost uncertainty can
be analyzed in a convenient way.
Article I provides a basic framework for the remainder of the thesis as regards
calculations of costs and nutrient transports. This framework is extended in article
II to include stochastic nutrient loads and in article III to allow for nutrient
interaction. In article IV cost functions and nutrient transports are highly
simplified, although heterogeneity in costs and nutrient transports is still allowed
for.
For calculation of the empirical cost functions, it is assumed that prices of
fertilizers and agricultural outputs are unaffected by changes in fertilizer use, land
use and livestock holdings. For fertilizers, it is reasonable to assume that changes
in demand in the Baltic Sea region will not affect the price. Reductions in fertilizer23
use might however increase prices of agricultural outputs, and reductions in
livestock holdings might increase livestock prices. The sensitivity of models with
regard to different types of abatement costs has been investigated, and suggests that
these effects would not change the substance of the results.
The focus of the thesis is on pollution of marine waters. When reducing loads to
coastal waters, this can, however, have effects on inland water quality. Reductions
of nitrogen emissions may lead to improved drinking water quality and reductions
in phosphorus emissions may reduce eutrophication of lakes. Notably, many of the
countries in the Baltic Sea region have unhealthily high nitrate levels in ground and
eutrophicated lakes (EEA, 1999a, b). These effects on inland water quality are not
taken into account. To incorporate them in the models used in this thesis, it would
be necessary include benefit calculations or water quality constraints for receptor
points both in the inland and in the sea. Data necessary for doing this are not
available.
Also because of data limitations, inland municipal point sources are not included
in the studies. The reason is that data on emissions from these sources were not
available at the time that articles I and II were written. Later, some data have
become available (HELCOM, 2001). Rough calculations that ignore retention
suggest that the total emissions from inland sources are about equally large as the
total emissions from coastal point sources. Also, airborne nitrogen emissions are
excluded from the study. These airborne emissions account for roughly one tenth
of the total nitrogen load to the Baltic Sea.
The models used are all static with the exception of article IV, where time is
treated in a highly simplified manner. Also, the studies are limited to partial
equilibrium analysis. One can note that the results in Johannesson & Rand￿s (2000)
indicate that the structural impact of nutrient emission reductions can be large for
the countries in transition, and the partial equilibrium approach may therefore
imply an underestimation of costs in these countries. Implications of uncertainty
for individual decision-making by farmers or wastewater treatment plant operators
are not dealt with in the thesis. For a review of how different environmentally
related policies affect farmer risk, see e.g. Bosch & Pease (2000).
The Baltic Sea
All applications in this thesis are made to nutrient emissions to the Baltic Sea. The
Baltic Sea is one of the largest brackish-water seas on Earth, with a fourfold larger
drainage basin. Around 85 million people live in the drainage area, and agricultural
and industrial production is intensive. Population, in particular the urban
population, is heavily concentrated to the coast, while most types of land use are
more or less evenly distributed throughout the drainage basin (Turner et al., 1999).
During the last century, nutrient loads to the Baltic Sea increased fourfold for
nitrogen and eight times for phosphorus due to increased population and
intensification of agriculture and industry within the drainage basin (Gren, Turner
& Wulff, 2000). Loads seem to have stabilized in the last decades, at least
temporarily. Since the 1980s, riverine loads of nitrogen and phosphorus to the24
Baltic Sea have remained fairly constant, although at a high level (St￿lnacke et al.,
1999).
The physical properties of the Baltic Sea make it particularly vulnerable with
regard to pollution. Only certain species can live in the low salinity of the Baltic,
and diversity has been further reduced due to the extensive areas of oxygen
deficiency (Elmgren, 2001). The excess loads of nutrients lead to frequent and
massive blooms of algae. When decaying, the algae cause oxygen depletion in the
water and in bottom sediments. Naturally low water exchange between surface and
bottom waters contributes to low oxygen concentrations in the deeper parts of the
sea. In some years, 25% of the total area has suffered from severe lack of oxygen
(Turner et al., 1999). Today, eutrophication is a problem in the entire Baltic Sea,
with an exception for the two northern basins, Bothnian Bay and Bothnian Sea.
The problems are particularly pressing in certain coastal areas and in the Gulf of
Finland and the Gulf of Riga (Gren, Turner & Wulff, 2000).
The Baltic Sea was the first place where environmental changes to an entire
marine ecosystem were documented (Gren, Turner & Wulff, 2000). In spite of
extensive research on the Sea from the 1960s and onwards there is still large
uncertainty regarding
-  the role of human activities versus natural processes for the final loads
-  the relationship between nutrient loads and concentrations in sea water and
-  the different roles of nitrogen and phosphorus for eutrophication.
Some of the main reasons for the difficulty to quantify these relationships is the
heterogeneity and variability of the Sea and its ecosystems (Turner et al., 1999;
Elmgren, 2001).
The need for future action as regards eutrophication of the Baltic Sea will
depend on how the ecosystem responds to measures that have already been
undertaken. This response is little known at the moment (St￿lnacke et al., 1999;
HELCOM, 2001; Elmgren, 2001). The stress on the Baltic Sea ecosystem due to
human activities may increase with population increases and with economic
expansion in the region. The economies in the former socialist countries are
expected to grow, although it is uncertain how long the economic recovery will
take. When the economies expand, loads from agriculture and industry are likely to
increase (HELCOM, 2001). In the longer term, eutrophication may also be affected
by climate change (Elmgren, 2001).
The Baltic Sea Convention
In 1974, the countries around the Baltic Sea signed the Convention on the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. The most important
part of the agreement was the establishment of the Helsinki Commission,
HELCOM, that should administer the cooperation, promote research, define
pollution criteria and adopt recommendations on pollution prevention (Ebbeson,
1996). The 1974 Convention did not stipulate binding measures for land-based
pollution, although emissions from land-based sources are of crucial importance
for water-quality. The relative weakness of the 1974 Convention as regards the
obligations for the countries to pursue pollution reductions can partly be explained25
by the Convention being signed during the Cold War period. The aim was not only
to enhance environmental cooperation in the region, but also to reduce the tension
between Eastern and Western Europe (Hjorth, 1996).
The Baltic Convention was reworked in connection with the large political and
economic changes in the region caused by collapse of the Soviet regime. A new
Convention was signed in 1992, and the new version included more stringent
obligations for the countries to reduce marine pollution originating from land-
based sources. Still, the new 1992 Convention did not require binding reductions in
emissions from the signatories but instead, it stipulated that Best Available
Technology or Best Environmental Practice should be used for pollution control
(Ebbeson, 1996). Environmental targets, in the form of percentage load reductions,
were instead prescribed in the 1988 and 1990 Ministerial Declarations, which do
not have the same legal status as a convention. There, it was agreed that nutrient
loads to the Baltic Sea should be reduced by 50% between 1987 and 1995. Around
1995, it was clear that this target would not be met and therefore, 2005 was chosen
as a new deadline.
The 1992 Convention was an improvement in comparison with the 1974
Convention in that it required regular reports on implementation of the convention
by the parties (Ebbeson, 1996). A working document from HELCOM shows that
the 50% load reductions were not achieved by far in 1995 (HELCOM, 2001). Load
reductions were large in the countries in the transition. This was, however, mainly
explained by the economic collapse after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
the early 1990s (Kotov et al., 1997). Industrial and agricultural loads had fallen
sharply as a result of the decline in production. Municipal loads had decreased due
to considerable investments in the construction and reconstruction of wastewater
treatment plants. Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden had undertaken
relatively smaller reductions than the countries in transition. This can partly be
explained by point source load reductions being costly in these countries, as the
wastewater cleaning capacity is already high (HELCOM, 2001). Agricultural loads
in these countries were little reduced. One possible explanation for this is the
strong political role of agricultural interest organizations in these countries
(Eckerberg, 1997).
In articles I-III in this thesis, it is assumed that HELCOM has a role as
international decision-maker in the region. Accordingly, national policies as well as
the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union, EU, are treated as
exogenous.  This assumption seems more reasonable for the beginning of the 1990s
than for the end. In the early 1990s, the Convention had recently been changed,
and when the Soviet Union collapsed, increased cooperation in the Baltic region
seemed a plausible future scenario. In the end of the decade however, both Sweden
and Finland joined the EU, while Poland and the Baltic States showed their interest
to candidate for membership. Although EU has signed the Helsinki Convention,
the different roles of HELCOM and EU as regards the responsibilities for
management of marine water quality in the Baltic Sea seem not clearly defined. For
the future, cooperation in the region is likely to depend on the outcome of the
ongoing enlargement process of the EU. Growing trade and increased factor26
movements between countries may also change the conditions for environmental
cooperation (see e.g. M￿ler, 1989).
Article  I ￿ cost-effective reductions in agricultural nitrogen
loads
Article I applies the ￿basic approach￿, described in the literature review, to riverine
loads of nitrogen from the agricultural sector to the Baltic Sea. It includes all
countries around the Sea, but not all different sectors that contribute to nitrogen
pollution. The study has been used as input in the work of Gren, Elofsson & Jannke
(1997).
In article I, it is assumed that an international decision-maker for the Baltic Sea
region wants to reduce nitrogen loads from agricultural sources to coastal waters
by 50% at minimum cost. The Baltic Sea watershed is divided into 17 regions that
differ with regard to abatement costs and nutrient transports. Nitrogen loads can be
reduced through changes in land use, improved manure management, reduced
consumption of chemical fertilizers and reductions in livestock holdings in all
regions. Fertilizer reductions and land use changes are modeled as interdependent
with regard to their impact on nutrient loads: if the use of one of these measures is
increased, then the impact of the other on nutrient loads decreases. Similarly to
other studies applied to large-scale water pollution (Johnsen, 1993; Gren, Elofsson
& Jannke, 1997; van der Veeren & Tol, 2001), cost functions for nutrient
application, cropping choices and management choices are separable. Data
included are, as far as possible, from 1991. In several cases, data on costs and
nutrient transports were not available, in particular for the countries in transition. In
these cases, data were obtained by extrapolation from other regions.
The results show that if the load target should be reached at minimum cost,
Poland has to undertake the largest reductions of all countries, nearly 40% of the
total reduction, and carry more than 60% of the total abatement cost. Russia and
the Baltic States together account for approximately one tenth of both total
abatement and total cost. Abatement in each of the EU-countries; Finland, Sweden,
Denmark and Germany, is between 10 and 20% of total abatement, but these
countries each carry less than 10% of the total costs.
Two different policy scenarios were compared, the cost-effective solution and a
scenario where countries are required to reduce loads uniformly by 50%. This
comparison shows the total cost would be nearly 60% higher with uniform
reductions. Also, Denmark, Finland and Poland may prefer uniform reductions to
Baltic-wide, cost-effective reductions, because their total abatement cost is lower
with uniform reductions. This result can be compared with Gren, Elofsson &
Jannke (1997), where more sectors and abatement options are covered. There, it is
concluded that the costs of uniform reductions are five times higher than when
reductions are distributed cost-effectively. Gren, Elofsson & Jannke (1997) also
conclude that Poland and the Baltic States prefer a uniform reduction policy to a
cost-effective one. Thus, uniform reductions are considerably more costly than are
cost-effective reductions, but one obstacle to a Baltic-wide cost-effective
abatement program is that Poland may prefer not to cooperate, unless there are27
institutions that change the distribution of costs to the countries. Markovska &
Zylicz (1999) provide one suggestion for the design of such cost-sharing
arrangements.
Turning to the different abatement measures, the results from article I suggest
that it is necessary to undertake substantial fertilizer reductions if the load target
should be reached. Reductions in fertilizer use account for larger reductions in
loads than do land use changes. This conclusion coincides with other studies,
where large relative load reductions are deemed necessary (e.g. Yiridoe &
Weersink, 1998; Horan et al., 2001). The results also indicate that manure
management can only play a minor role for a Baltic-wide abatement program, due
to the small capacity of the measure. Livestock reductions are costly compared to
other measures, and play a very small role with regard to cost-effective load
reductions. The conclusion that measures in the livestock sector are costly, is
consistent with the results in van der Veeren & Tol (2001), although one can note
that van der Veeren & Tol (2001) include also other measures at livestock farms,
that are less costly than livestock reductions.
Article II ￿ cost-effectiveness with stochastic nutrient loads
Article II expands on article I by taking uncertainty about nutrient loads into
account, and by including phosphorus emissions and coastal point sources. It is
assumed the international decision-maker￿s problem is to reduce loads of both
nutrients to the Baltic Sea from the included sources by 50% compared to 1997
levels at minimum cost and with relatively high certainty. The model includes
probabilistic constraints on nutrient loads to coastal waters. Probabilistic
constraints are useful for analysis of uncertainties in the physical relationship
between abatement undertaken at different sources and the corresponding
environmental damage.
The study includes two types of measures that differ with regard to their
stochastic behavior, agricultural measures and measures at coastal point sources. It
is assumed that due to weather-driven variations in the retention of nutrients in
rivers, the impact of abatement at agricultural sources on coastal loads cannot be
determined with certainty, while the impact of abatement at coastal point sources is
known with certainty. Moreover, it is assumed that the relative variation in loads
from agricultural sources differs between regions and that load from different
regions can be correlated. Thus, the policy-maker has to take into account how
uncertainty affects decisions regarding both the total level of abatement and the
allocation between regions and abatement measures.
Notably, few other empirical studies have analyzed the role of covariance
between measures or regions for the allocation of abatement. McSweeny & Shortle
(1990) include covariance between measures on farm level, and assume that
correlation is strongly positive, but lack empirical data. Bystr￿m, Andersson &
Gren (2000) investigate the role of correlation between upstream and downstream
measures, but have no empirical data on correlation. The novelty of this study is
the analysis of the implications of the sign of covariance between regions for costs
and allocation of abatement. The empirical model makes use of a variance-28
covariance matrix of annual nutrient loads, based on data from 1970 to 1993
(St￿lnacke, 2000). This matrix shows that for a large watershed such as the Baltic
Sea, covariance of loads from different regions can be negative, zero or positive.
The sign of covariance is highly related to the meteorological properties of the
watershed.
In line with earlier studies, the analysis shows that if the decision-maker cares
about load variations then the total cost of load reductions must be higher,
compared to the case when variance is ignored, as more abatement must be
undertaken in order to create a ￿safety margin￿. The empirical results show that if
loads to the Baltic Sea should be halved, the total costs can be 80% higher if the
target should be reached with 95% certainty, than if the decision-maker ignores
variations in loads. The calculations also show that if correlation between regions
were ignored, the total costs for reaching the same target would be underestimated
by more than 20%.
The theoretical analysis shows that if loads from a particular region are strongly
positively correlated with much of the loads from other regions, it is cost-effective
to abate more in that region. Thereby, it is possible to keep down the total load in
years where these regions have high emission levels. On the other hand, if loads
from a region are negatively correlated with much of the loads from other regions,
less abatement should be made in that particular region. This is because when loads
are high in this region, low loads in many other regions compensate this. The
empirical model shows that the inclusion of covariance between regional loads can
have large effects on the allocation of costs between different countries, compared
to when covariance is ignored.
Turning to a comparison of measures, the results show that for both nitrogen and
phosphorus, reductions in point source loads are large in the cost-effective
solution. The same holds for nitrogen fertilizers, but reductions in phosphorus
fertilizers are less important in a cost-effective program. Land use changes have a
larger role for phosphorus than for nitrogen load reductions. The results also
suggest that there are economies of scope from coordinated nitrogen and
phosphorus reductions if large certainty is required, but that there is little need to
coordinate policies for low levels of certainty. This is because for higher levels of
certainty, measures that reduce both nitrogen and phosphorus loads, such as
changes in land use and reductions of livestock holdings, have to be undertaken if
the load targets should be met.
From a policy perspective, it is also interesting to note that taking load
uncertainty into account does not change the ranking of the three largest polluter
countries with regard to abatement costs, and therefore it is likely to have limited
impact on countries position with regard to international negotiations. Also
noteworthy, higher certainty requires larger total emission reductions, but it does
not change the ranking of different types of abatement measures.29
Article III ￿ allocation of nitrogen and phosphorus loads when
both nutrients contribute to algae production
The novelty of the study in article III, is that the implications of nutrient interaction
for the cost-effective abatement strategy is investigated. Thereby, the study differs
from most other applied water pollution studies that are, generally, focussed on a
single nutrient. Some researchers analyze nitrogen policies, and motivate this by
the health effects of groundwater nitrates (e.g. Fleming & Adams, 1997; Yiridoe &
Weersink, 1998). Others refer to a politically determined reduction target for the
nutrient in question (e.g. Johnsen, 1993; Markovska & Zylicz, 1999; Gren, 2001;
van der Veeren & Tol, 2001), or by the nutrient being limiting for algae production
in the initial situation (e.g. Johnsen, 1993; Wier & Hasler, 1999; Goetz &
Zilberman, 2000). A few papers include both nitrogen and phosphorus, but have
separate targets for the two nutrients, and hence investigate joint costs of abatement
but not pollutant interaction (e.g. Milon, 1987; Gren, Elofsson & Jannke, 1997).
Thus, the question of nutrient interaction with regard to water quality has
achieved little attention in the economic literature, in spite of nitrogen and
phosphorus both being necessary for algae growth and hence for eutrophication.
This contrasts with the agricultural economics literature, where the substitutability
of nutrients with regard to crop production on small plots is treated in a several
studies (e.g. Ackello-Oguto, Paris & Williams, 1985; Paris, 1992; Chambers &
Lichtenberg, 1996). The links between the production function for small plots and
the corresponding aggregate production function are analyzed in Berck & Helfand
(1990).
According to marine ecology literature, algae take up nutrient in fixed
proportions (see e.g. Magnusson et al., 1994; Coffaro & Sfriso, 1997). Algae
production is to large extent determined by nutrient concentrations in sea water,
but the uptake of nutrients from the water differs between algae species, in
particular between algae that can us atmospheric nitrogen for their photosynthesis
and those that cannot (Tyrrell, 1999). Also, nutrient concentrations vary between
different basins of an aquifer and between coastal regions and the open sea. In
order to analyze nutrient interaction, it is assumed in this study, that due to
heterogeneity of the aquifer and of algae species, the algae production function is
continuous and differentiable. Moreover, it is assumed that algae production can
change from being nitrogen- to being phosphorus-limited, and that therefore, the
algae production function has isoquants that are convex to the origin.
The theoretical analysis shows that if the elasticity of substitution between
nutrients is small, emission reductions should, to a larger extent, be focussed on
one of the nutrients. The reason is that with a small elasticity of substitution, a
reduction in the load of one of the nutrients implies that the other nutrient cannot
be used by growing algae and therefore, cannot cause any harm. The nutrient to
focus on is not necessarily the one that is limiting for algae production in the initial
situation. Instead, the allocation of abatement between the two nutrients is
determined by the relative marginal costs of abatement and the relative marginal
impact on algae production.30
If, on the other hand, costs rise rapidly with the level of abatement and the
elasticity of substitution is high, then it can be cost-effective to reduce both
nutrients. The reason is that with a high elasticity of substitution, a reduction in one
nutrient will not reduce algae production effectively, because the other nutrient will
still contribute to algae growth. This situation is more likely to appear when the
aquifer is heterogeneous with regard to nutrient concentrations and algae species
differ with regard to nutrient uptake from water.
The analysis is applied to cost-effective reductions in algae production in the
Baltic Proper, which is the basin in the Baltic Sea that receives the largest nutrient
loads. The empirical model indicates that a stronger focus on phosphorus
reductions compared to nitrogen reductions can be cost-effective if policy-makers
want to reduce algae production. This contrasts with the current Baltic-wide policy
with equal reduction rates for nitrogen and phosphorus.
The main explanation for this result is that although nitrogen is currently limiting
algae production, this is not due to small nitrogen emissions but to large
assimilation of nitrogen emissions by the environment through e.g. denitrification.
Instead, phosphorus loads are small compared to nitrogen loads. Because of these
smaller emissions, it is less costly to abate a large fraction of phosphorus emissions
than a large fraction of the nitrogen emissions.
The model in this paper shows the importance of including both nitrogen and
phosphorus in economic models of measures against eutrophication, in particular if
large load reductions are considered necessary. However, it is important to note
that several characteristics of the algae production function are not taken into
account in the study. Firstly, the time perspective has not been included. If
phosphorus emissions are reduced, it will take approximately 25 years for Baltic
Proper to reach a new steady state with lower phosphorus concentrations, while if
nitrogen is reduced this will have full effect on nitrogen concentrations in 10 years
(Turner et al., 1999). Thus, the benefits of nitrogen reductions can be obtained
sooner than can those of phosphorus reductions. Secondly, nitrogen and
phosphorus interact in more ways than taken into account in the study, both during
the river transports and in the sea (see e.g. St￿lnacke, 1996; Wulff, 2000). Thirdly,
there is considerable uncertainty about the size of phosphorus reductions necessary
for the Baltic Proper to shift to phosphorus limitation. Inclusion of these aspects is
likely to affect the conclusions as regards the allocation of nitrogen and phosphorus
emissions.
Article IV ￿ unilateral abatement under cost uncertainty
Environmental groups sometimes advocate that their own country should undertake
unilateral abatement. This is usually motivated with the argument that undertaking
unilateral action is at least at step in the right direction, and that if the own country
sets a good example, this might affect the behavior of other countries such that they
also undertake abatement (Hoel, 1991). One way, by which unilateral abatement
could be beneficial, is if it reduces uncertainty.  It is commonly suggested in the
political debate that unilateral action in the form of pilot projects, or promotion of
new and environmentally friendly technologies, should be undertaken because the31
benefits from providing new information can be high (Schmidt, 1998). Hoel (1991)
suggests, that if there are producer lobby groups in a foreign country that argue that
abatement costs are high, unilateral action in the home country can be used to
demonstrate that such reductions can actually be made without high costs.
Article IV investigates whether uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement can
be an incentive for a self-interested country to undertake unilateral action. To my
knowledge, there is no other study where the role of cost uncertainty for unilateral
abatement is investigated.
Abatement costs for different environmental policies are rarely known when a
policy is decided upon. Harrington, Morgenstern & Nelson (2000) analyze how ex
ante estimates of abatement costs differ from the ex post observations. They
conclude that the ex ante unit costs of abatement can be inaccurate if, for example,
technological innovation is not accounted for, cost information is out-of-date, or
underestimation of costs can be embarrassing for the persons responsible.
Uncertainty about the unit cost of abatement is thus strongly linked to the use of
technologies.
Article IV assumes that there are two non-identical, risk-averse countries and
that the unit costs of abatement in the two countries are uncertain but correlated.
Such correlation can be explained by e.g. similarities in abatement technologies.
Moreover, it is assumed that the countries take a once-and-for-all decision on a
large, irreversible abatement program and that these decisions can be taken either
simultaneously or sequentially.
Intuitively, one could imagine that with correlated abatement costs, undertaking
unilateral action in a country, say country 1, may reduce uncertainty about the cost
in another country, say country 2, if country 2 waits and observes ex post
abatement costs in country 1. When learning about ex post abatement cost in
country 1, country 2 is able to make a more precise guess about costs in the own
country. When uncertainty is reduced in this way, country 2 might be willing to
abate more. Thereby, utility in country 2 could increase due to the reduction in cost
uncertainty, and utility in country 1 could increase due to higher abatement in
country 2.
However, as this study shows, the above intuitive reasoning ignores important
aspects of the problem. As is shown in the article, unilateral abatement would
reduce uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement more, if a country with small
uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with (initially) large
uncertainty would follow. But for reasonable parameter values, it is quite possible
that neither country would like to participate in a game where the country with low
cost uncertainty moves first. The country with low cost uncertainty might not like
to make the first move because when cost uncertainty is large in the follower
country, the first mover will be highly uncertain about the follower￿s future
abatement decision. This uncertainty reduces utility in the first country, because
this country will not know in advance if it chooses the best abatement level in
relation to the level that will actually be chosen by the follower country. The
follower country, on the other hand, may not benefit at all from the reduced cost
uncertainty. The reason is that the first country can shift over much of the32
abatement burden on the follower country. When the follower has to undertake
more abatement, variance of total cost may be unchanged or even increase, even if
variance of the unit cost is reduced.
Instead, both countries may prefer taking their decisions simultaneously, or let
the country with high cost uncertainty move first, such that unilateral action will
not reduce cost uncertainty to any larger extent. One can note that the conclusion,
regarding which country prefers to act as Stackelberg leader, is consistent with the
results in Albaek (1990), where uncorrelated cost uncertainty is modeled in a
duopoly setting.
A numerical example, where Sweden and Poland decide on nitrogen abatement
levels under correlated cost uncertainty, illustrates the model in this study. It is
assumed that the two countries have similar abatement technologies and therefore
positively correlated unit costs of abatement. Also, it is assumed that Polish
abatement costs are lower than Swedish, and that therefore, the variance of Polish
abatement costs is smaller. The results suggest that both countries would prefer
either to take abatement decisions simultaneously or let Sweden abate first, while
Poland follows, compared to letting Poland move first.
The results from the numerical example also suggest that unilateral action under
cost uncertainty leads to an increase in total emissions, compared to when countries
take their abatement decisions simultaneously. This result is obtained
independently of whether the country with high or low cost uncertainty moves first.
These results contrast with the results in Hoel (1991), where it is concluded that
under non-cooperation, unilateral action leads to smaller total emissions. The
differences in results is explained by different interpretations of unilateral action,
Hoel (1991) interprets unilateral action as a country acting as if it has larger
benefits from abatement than in actually the case, while in this thesis, unilateral
action is interpreted as one country acting before another.
Conclusions
This thesis fills some of the gaps in knowledge regarding policy-making for large-
scale water pollution. The role of heterogeneity of the watershed and the aquifer
for policy-making is analyzed, as well as the role of uncertainty and nutrient
interaction. The results show that economic considerations are of large importance
for policies that are intended to deal with uncertainties about natural processes and
technologies as well as pollutant interaction. Thus, economists can contribute to
policy-making through analysis of how these issues are related to costs and benefits
of abatement and how they affect international negotiations between countries. In
this final chapter, I first summarize the contribution of the articles to the literature.
Then, I present policy suggestions with regard to nutrient pollution of the Baltic
Sea and suggestions for further research.33
Contribution of articles to the literature
There are four main messages that emerge from the articles; the first concerns the
relationship between different random events; the second deals with the role of the
ecosystem response to emission changes while the third is about the role of low-
cost countries with regard to pollution of a common, international resource and the
fourth pertains to the scientific value of ￿simple￿ models.
Firstly, articles II and IV suggest that when the spatial scale of the analysis is
large, random events can be different across regions, but they might be interrelated.
These studies show that it matters for the policy conclusions whether uncertainties
are treated as interrelated or not. In article II, I show that the fact that pollutant
loads from different regions are stochastic and correlated has large impact on total
minimum abatement costs and the allocation of costs between countries. In article
IV, it is shown that correlated cost uncertainty has considerable implications for
countries￿ decisions on whether they should undertake abatement before other
countries, or wait for other countries to move first. The studies show that links
between different random events can have large implications for the optimal choice
of policy and that policy decisions in general affect the extent of both
environmental and economic risk.
Secondly, in articles I-III, I have analyzed the implications of treating aquatic
ecosystems not as inert media that passively receive emissions, but as active
production systems. In article I, this is made in a simple way, by taking into
account nutrient assimilation. This is extended in article II to include variability of
nutrient assimilation, and in article III to allow for nutrient interaction. The
response of the ecosystem to changes in emissions is shown to be of large
importance for policy consideration, both as regards the total extent of action and
the choice of emission sources and pollutants to address.
Thirdly, articles I and IV both address the issue of how individual countries may
act when confronted with an international pollution problem. In article I, it is
concluded that countries with low abatement costs may prefer a uniform reduction
policy compared to an international, cost-effective policy, because the uniform
reduction policy can be associated with lower total abatement costs for these
countries. In article IV, it is suggested that uncertainty of abatement costs might be
smaller in low-cost countries than in high-cost countries. It is shown that countries
with low cost-uncertainty are likely to prefer to wait for other countries to
undertake abatement first, compared to abating prior to others. Thus, the results
suggest that there might be double reasons for low-cost countries to be passive with
regard to pollution of the international commons. The first reason is that they may
want to avoid high costs associated with cost-effective reduction. The second
reason is that waiting can reduce environmental risk in these countries.
Fourthly, article I, where costs and pollutant transports are modeled in a
relatively simple manner, has proven to be useful as a baseline scenario, with
which to compare the other studies. Such simple models can be useful both as a
basis for further research, and for measuring the magnitude of the importance of
additional aspects of the problem.34
Policy suggestions for the Baltic Sea
There are at least two policy issues that could be discussed in light of the results
from this thesis. The first issue is whether and how policies should be
accommodated to uncertainty and the second is whether there is a need to reform
the current de facto policy with uniform reduction rates for nutrients and countries
(see e.g. HELCOM, 2001).
The results from the thesis suggest that the fact that nutrient loads to coastal
waters are stochastic and vary between years does not have any impact on the
ranking of cost-effective abatement measures or on the ranking of countries with
regard to abatement costs. However, the existence of load variations may still
provide a reason for policy change if peak loads in single years cause high
environmental damage. In that case, it is necessary to undertake more abatement in
total, in order to have a safety margin with regard to natural variations in loads.
The thesis does not support unilateral action that is undertaken with a purpose to
reduce uncertainty about the costs of abatement, if it is necessary to undertake a
large, irreversible abatement program in order to obtain accurate cost information.
On the contrary, unilateral action that reduces uncertainty efficiently can lead to
larger total emissions and lower utility to the involved countries. One question that
arises here is whether large nutrient reductions to the Baltic Sea are necessary to
obtain accurate information about the costs for reducing nutrient loads to the Baltic
Sea. It seems to me that this might indeed be the case. In spite of many years of
abatement projects in different parts of the watershed, there is still considerable
uncertainty about the costs associated with the international load reduction targets.
One of the reasons for this is the large number of non-point sources contributing to
pollution, and the difficulties associated with the calculation of costs associated
with policies that reduce emissions from those. Thus the conclusions as regards
unilateral abatement might well apply to nutrient reductions to the Baltic Sea.
Turning to the issue of uniform reductions for countries and nutrients, the thesis
confirms the old wisdom that there are considerable cost savings to be made from
abandoning the approach with uniform reductions (see e.g. Tietenberg, 1985).
Taking first the current de facto policy with uniform reductions for all countries, it
is clear from this thesis as well as from other studies that there would be large
savings from a reallocation of abatement efforts between countries. In particular,
an institutional arrangement that would encourage Polish abatement would be
beneficial to the whole region. Secondly, as regards the uniform reduction rates for
nitrogen and phosphorus, the results indicate that this policy can be costly
compared to a policy that aims at reducing eutrophication. The results suggest that
undertaking more phosphorus reductions and less nitrogen reductions might save
costs. It is important to note that the conclusions as regards the allocation between
nutrients are of a preliminary nature, and that the issue needs further research. If
the conclusion holds, however, and more phosphorus reductions should be
undertaken, this implies larger costs in the countries in transition, where
phosphorus loads are high, because wastewater treatment is less developed.35
Thus, if the uniform policies for countries or nutrients are to be abandoned for a
cost-effective policy then, in either case, more abatement should be undertaken in
the countries in transition. For this to reduce costs in reality, it might be necessary
to improve international financing institutions and the coordination between them.
Today, the extent and effectiveness of foreign support to water quality
improvements in these countries is not well documented, and activities are little
coordinated (Hjorth, 1996).
Suggestions for future research
There are at least two interesting extensions possible to articles II and III. Firstly, it
would be possible to investigate the role of stochastic loads in a model with
nutrient interaction, while making use of available empirical data on variance and
covariance of nitrogen and phosphorus loads. This analysis can be carried out
using a model with probabilistic constraints, similarly as in article II. Such a study
could provide useful knowledge on the role of covariance between nitrogen and
phosphorus loads for costs and the allocation of abatement between the two
nutrients. Secondly, it would be interesting to carry out an analysis of how
uncertainty about the shape of the algae production function affects the allocation
between nitrogen and phosphorus reduction. In particular there is uncertainty about
the point where the system switches from nitrogen to phosphorus limitation. This
analysis would make possible to analyze how the advantage of being able to reduce
environmental damage through reductions in a single nutrient, such as discussed in
this thesis, is affected by uncertainty about the point where nutrient-limitation
shifts.
Article IV can also be extended in several ways. Firstly, one subject would be to
investigate theoretically whether there is a link between the endogenous choice by
countries to play either a Cournot or a Stackelberg game, and the corresponding
total emission level. Compared to the analysis in article IV, this would require a
simplification of the payoffs and possibly also of the type of uncertainty. One point
of departure for such a model is e.g. Haslbeck (1995), where sequential
contributions to a public good under asymmetric information is modeled in a
Stackelberg game. There are also several models that endogenize the choice of
game to be played, Cournot or Stackelberg, in a duopoly setting (Sadanand &
Sadanand, 1996; van Damme & Hurkens, 1999). Such as study could give more
information about situations when unilateral abatement will or will not lead to
more emissions.
A second possible extension of article IV is an analysis of how a social planner
should, optimally, choose the sequential order of different abatement projects.
Looking at the Baltic Sea region, there are numerous local and regional abatement
projects. The choice of location and design for these projects may today be
determined by different factors, such as e.g. severity of local environmental
problems, availability of expertise and attitudes of local governments and interest
organizations. The results from these projects are usually reported and
documented, and used when planning new abatement projects. For these new
projects, the results from earlier projects can be used, not as absolutely accurate36
predictions of the parameters that will apply for the new project, but as indicators.
Parameters are likely to be correlated between projects but not identical. One
question here is how a utility maximizing social planner should determine the order
and size of projects given his beliefs about how valuable the information from a
project will be for other projects. One point of departure for such a study could be
a model of adaptive utility (see e.g. Cyert and de Groot, 1987).
The role of the complex organizational framework for nonpoint pollution
management is not analyzed in this thesis, although it is a field of large importance
for reductions of non-point source emissions. One interesting subject for a study is
the local enforcement of nationally determined environmental policies. Studies by
political scientists (Eckerberg, 1997) suggest that nationally determined policies
for non-point pollution are often weakened by inefficient local enforcement. The
determinants of environmental performance by governments and agencies has been
analyzed by several researchers (Dasgupta et al. 1995; Jahn, 1998; Karkkainen,
2002). To my knowledge, there has been no attempt to analyze the local
environmental performance with regard to water quality. It could be investigated
empirically, to what extent local governments take into account the impact of
emissions from wastewater treatment plants on the Baltic Sea. When deciding on
the level of wastewater treatment, self-interested municipalities may take into
account the impact on the Baltic Sea, but also e.g. local environmental effects, the
preferences of local voters and the possibility to be re-elected in the future. For
several of the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea, there are relatively good data
available on wastewater treatment plants, municipalities, regulations, local water
quality and the impact on the Baltic Sea.37
References
Ackello-Ogutu, C., Paris, Q. & Williams, W. 1985. Testing a von Liebig Crop Response
Function against Polynomial Specifications. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 67(4):873-80.
Albaek, S. 1990. Stackelberg Leadership as a Natural Solution under Cost Uncertainty.
Journal of Industrial Economics 38(3):335-47.
Archer, D.W. & Shogren, J.S. 2001. Risk-indexed herbicide taxes to reduce ground and
surface water pollution: an integrated ecological economics evaluation. Ecological
Economics 38:227-250.
Bargur, J.S., Davis, H.C. & Lofting, E.M. 1971. An Intersectoral Programming Model for
the Management of the Waste Water Economy of the San Francisco Bay Region. Water
Resources Research 7(6): 1393-1409.
Barrett, S. 1994. Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxford
Economic Papers 46: 878-894.
Baumol, J.W.  & Oates, W.E. 1988. The theory of environmental policy. 2
nd ed. Cambridge
University Press. Cambridge.
Beavis, B. & Walker, M. 1979. Interactive Pollutants and Joint Abatement Costs:
Achieving Water Quality Standards with Effluent Charges. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management; 6(4), p. 275-86.
Beavis, B. & Walker, M. 1983. Achieveing Environmental Standards with Stochastic
Discharges. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 10:103-11.
Becker, C.D. & Ostrom, E. 1995. Human Ecology and Resources Sustainabaility: The
Importance of Institutional Diversity. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 26:113-
33.
Berck, P., Geoghegan, J. & Stohs, S. 2000. A Strong Test of the von Liebig Hypothesis.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82(4):948-955.
Braden, J.B., Johnson, G.V., Bouzaher, A. & Miltz, D. Optimal Spatial Management of
Agricultural Pollution. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 71(2):404-413.
Bosch, D.J. & Pease, J.W. 2000. Economic Risk and Water Quality Protection in
Agriculture. Review of Agricultural Economics 22(2):438-463.
Bystr￿m, O., Andersson, H. and Gren, I-M. 2000. Economic Criteria for Using Wetlands as
Nitrogen Sinks under Uncertainty. Ecological-Economics 35(1):35-45.
Chambers, R.G. & Lichtenberg, E. 1996. A Nonparametric Approach to the von Liebig-
Paris Technology. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 8(2):373-86.
Charnes, A. & Cooper, W.W. 1963. Deterministic Equivalents for Optimizing and
Satisfying Under Chance Constraints. Operations Research 11(1):18-39.
Coase, R. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3:1-44.
Coffaro, G. & Sfriso, A. 1997. Simulation model of Ulva rigida growth in shallow water of
the Lagoon of Venice. Ecological Modelling 102:55-66.
Connor, J.D., Perry, G.M. & Adams, R.M. 1995.Cost-effective abatement of multiple
production externalities. Water Resources Research 31(7):1789-1796.
Cyert, R.M. & de Groot, M.H. 1987. Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic
Theory. Chapman and Hall. London.
Dasgupta, S., Mody, A., Roy, S. & Wheeler, D. 1995. Environmental regulation and
development: a cross-country empirical analysis. The World Bank,  Policy Research
Department. Working Paper No. 1448.
Dasgupta, P., M￿ler, K-G. & Vercelli, A. (eds.). 1997. The Economics of the Transnational
Commons. Clarendon Press, Oxford.
EEA. 1999a. (European Environmental Agency). Groundwater quality and quantity in
Europe. Environmental Assessment Report No 3. OPOCE, Copenhagen.
EEA. 1999b. (European Environmental Agency). Nutrients in European ecosystems.
Environmental assessment report No 4. OPOCE, Copenhagen.
EEA. 2001. (European Environmental Agency). Eutrophication in Europe’s coastal waters.
Topic report No 7/2001. EEA, Copenhagen.38
Ebbeson, J. 1996. 1992 Baltic Convention; Transition or stand-still? In R. Hjorth (ed.):
Baltic Environmental Cooperation ￿ A Regime in Transition. Link￿ping University,
Water and Environmental Studies, Tema V Report 23.
Eckerberg, K. 1997. Comparing the Local Use of Policy Instruments in Nordic and Baltic
Countries ￿ The Issue of Diffuse Water Pollution. Environmental Politics 6(2):24-47.
Ellis, J.H. 1987. Stochastic Water Quality Optimization Using Imbedded Constraints. Water
Resources Research 23(12):2227-2238.
Elmgren, R. 2001. Understanding Human Impact on the Baltic Ecosystem: Changing Views
in Recent Decades. Ambio 30(4-5).
Fleming, R.A. & Adams, R.M. 1997. The Importance of Site Specific Information in the
Design of Policies to Control Pollution. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 33:347-358.
Forsberg, C. 1994. The Large-Scale Flux of Nutrients from Land to Water and the
Eutrophication of Lakes and Marine Waters. Marine Pollution Bulletin 29:409-413.
Gabric, A.J. & Bell, P.R.F. 1993. Review of Non-point Nutrient Loading on Coastal
Ecosystems. Australian Journal of Marine and Freshwater Research 44:261-83.
Goetz, R.U. & Zilberman, D. 2000. The dynamics of spatial pollution: The case of
phosphorus runoff from agricultural land. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
24:143-163.
GPA. 1995. Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment
from Land-Based Activities. Adopted 3 Nov. 1995 by UNEPs Intergovernmental
Conference in Washington, D.C., 23 Oct. - 3 November 1995.
Gren, I-M., Elofsson, K. & Jannke, P. 1997. Cost-Effective Nutrient Reductions to the
Baltic Sea. Environmental and Resource Economics 10: 341-362.
Gren, I-M., Destouni, G., Scharin, H. & Bystr￿m, O. 2000a. Cost Effective Management of
Stochastic Coastal Water Pollution. Environmental Modelling and Assessment 5:193-
203.
Gren, I-M., Turner, K. & Wulff, F. (eds.). 2000. Managing a Sea ￿ The Ecological
Economics of the Baltic. Earthscan. London.
Gren, I-M., Destouni, G. & Tempone, R. 2000. Cost Effective Policies for Alternative
Distributions of Stochastic Water Pollution. Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics,
Discussion Paper Series 134. Stockholm.
Gren, I-M. 2001. International Versus National Action Against Nitrogen Pollution of the
Baltic Sea. Environmental and Resource Economics 20:41-59.
Grigg, N.S. 1996. Management Framework for Large-Scale Water Problems. Journal of
Water Resources Planning and Management 122 (4): 296-300.
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162:1243-1248.
Harrington, W., Morgenstern, R.D. & Nelson, P. 2000. On the Accuracy of Regulatory Cost
Estimates. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19(2):297-322.
Hart, R. 2002. Dynamic pollution control ￿ time lags and optimal restoration of marine
ecosystems. In Hart, R.: Dynamic Modelling of the Environment and the Economy.
Agraria 317. Acta Univsersitatis Agriculturae Sueciae. Swedish University of Agricultral
Sciences. [Dissertation].
Hart, R. & Brady, M. 2002. Nitrogen in the Baltic Sea ￿ Policy Implications of Stock
Effects. Accepted for publication in Journal of Environmental Management.
Haslbeck, C. 1995. Private Provision of a Public Good in a Stackelberg Game with
Incomplete Information. FinanzArchiv 52(3):364-78.
HELCOM. 2001. Evaluation of the Implementation of the 1988 Ministerial Declaration
Regarding Nutrient Load Reductions. Working document prepared by Pitk￿nen, H. and
L￿￿ne, A at The Finnish Environment Institute for the Helsinki Commission. Helsinki,
Finland.
Hjorth, R. 1996. The Role of International Organisations in Baltic Environmental
Cooperation. In: R. Hjorth (ed.): Baltic Environmental Cooperation ￿ A Regime in
Transition. Water and Environmental Studies, Link￿ping University, Tema V Report 23,
1996.
Hoag, D.L. & Hughes-Popp, J.S. 1997. Theory and Practices of Pollution Credit Trading in
Water Quality Management. Review of Agricultural Economics 19(2):252-262.39
Hoel, M.1991. Global Enviromental Problems: The Effects of Unilateral Actions Taken by
One Country. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 20, 55-70.
Horan, R.D., Abler, D.G., Shortle, J.S., Carmichael, J. & Wang, L. 2001. Point/Nonpoint
trading in the Susquehanna River Basin. Paper presented at the 11
th Annual Conference
of European Association of Environmental and Resorce Economics (EAERE),
Southampton University, England, 24-27 June 2001.
Horan, R.D. 2001. Cost-Effective and Stochastic Dominance Approaches to Stochastic
Pollution Control. Environmental and Resource Economics 18:373-389.
Jahn, D. 1998. Environmental performance and policy regimes: Explaining variations in 18
OECD-countries. Policy Sciences 31:107-131.
Johannesson, ¯. & Rand￿s, P. 2000. The Effects of Implementing Markets for Emission
Permits Nationally Versus Regionally. In: Gren, I-M., Turner, K. and Wulff, F. (eds.):
Managing a Sea ￿ The Ecological Economics of the Baltic. Earthscan Publications Ltd.,
London.
Johnsen, F.H. 1993. Economic analyses of measures to control phosphorus run-off from
non-point agricultural sources. European Review of Agricultural Economics 20:399-418.
Karkkainen, B.C. 2002. Towards a smarter Nepa: Monitoring and managing government￿s
environmental performance. Columbia Law Review 102(4):903-972.
Kim, C.S. & Hostetler, J.E. 1991. Policy Implications of a Water Quality-constrained
Dynamic Model of Nitrogen Fertilizer Use. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics
39:781-791.
Knowler, D. Barbier, E.B. & Strand, I. 2001. An Open-Access Model of Fisheries and
Nutrient Enrichment in the Black Sea. Marine Resource Economics 16(3):195-217.
Kotov, V. Nikitina, E., Roginko, A., Stokke, O.S. Victor, D.G. & Hjorth, R. 1997.
Implementation of International Environmental Commitments in Countries in Transition.
MOCT-MOST 7:103-128.
Lee, G.F., Jones, P.E. & Jones, R.A. 1991. Effects of Eutrophication on Fisheries. Reviews
in Aquatic Sciences. 5(3-4):287-305.
Letson, D. 1992. Point/Nonpoint Source Pollution Reduction Trading: An Interpretive
Survey. Natural Resources Journal 32(2):219-32.
Linnerooth-Bayer, J. & Murcott, S. 1996. The Danube River Basin: International
Cooperation or Sustainable Development. Natural Resources Journal 36:521-547.
Lundqvist, J. & Falkenmark, M. 2000. Drainage basin morphology: a starting point for
balancing water needs, land use and fishery protection. Fisheries Management and
Ecology, 7:1-14.
Magnusson, G., Axelsson, L., Larsson, C. & Ryberg, H. 1994. A Model for Cultivation of
Nutrient Uptake Capacity of Seaweeds in Cultivation. Botanica Marina 37:115-123.
Malik, A.S., Letson, D. & Crutchfield, S.R. 1993. Point/Nonpoint Source Trading of
Pollution Abatement: Choosing the Right Trading Ratio. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 75:959-967.
Markovska, A. & Zylicz, T. 1999. Costing and international public good: the case of the
Baltic Sea. Ecological Economics 30:301-316.
McSweeny, W.T. & Shortle, J.S. 1990. Probabilistic Cost Effectiveness in Agricultural
Non-point Pollution Control. Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics 22(1):95-104.
Milon, J.W. 1987. Optimizing Nonpoint Source Controls in Water Quality Regulation.
Water Resources Bulletin 23(3):387-396.
Musu, I. 1997. The Interdependence between Environment and Development: Marine
Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea. In: Dasgupta, P., M￿ler, K-G. and Vercelli, A. (eds.):
The Economics of the Transnational Commons. Clarendon Press. Oxford.
M￿ler, K-G. 1989. International Environmental Problems. Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 6.
M￿ler, K-G. 1989. The Acid Rain Game. In: Folmer, H. and Ierlands, E.C. (eds): Valuation
Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science
Publishers, 231-52.
M￿ler, K-G., Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A. 2000. The Economics of Shallow Lakes.
Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Discussion Paper Series 131. Stockholm.40
Naevdal, E. 2001. Optimal Regulation of Eutrophying Lakes, Fjords, and Rivers in the
Presence of Threshold Effects. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(4):972-
984.
Ostrom, E. & Schlager, E. 1996. The Formations of Property Rights. In: Hanna, S., Folke,
C. and M￿ler, K-G. (eds.): Rights to Nature. Island Press. Washington D.C.
Paaby, H. Jensen, J.J., Kristensen, P. M￿ller, F. & Skop, E. 1996. Reducing Nutrient
Loadings to Marine Waters: A Cost Effectiveness Analysis. In: Madsen, B., Jensen-
Butler, C. Mortensen, J. B. & Bruun Christensen, A. M. (eds): Modelling the Economy
and the Environment. Springer-Verlag.
Paris, Q. 1992. The von Liebig Hypothesis. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
74(4):1019-28..
Pigou, A.C. 1920. The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan. London.
Rabalais, N. 2000. Continental Scale Nonpoint Pollution and Hypoxia in the Gulf of
Mexico. Paper presented at the Workshop on Large-Scale Drainage Basin Water
Management, 17-18 November 2000, Stockholm, Sweden.
Russell, C.S. & Shogren, J.F. 1993. Theory, modeling and experience in the management of
nonpoint-source pollution. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dordrecht.
Sadanand, A. & Sadanand, V. 1996. Firm Scale and the Endogeneous Timing of Entry: A
Choice between Commitment and Flexibility. Journal of Economic Theory 70:516-530.
Segerson, K. 1988. Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 15(1): 87-98.
Schmidt, C. 1998. Incentives for International Environmental Cooperation: Theoretic
Models and Economic Instruments. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper
56.98.
Shoemaker, R.A., Ervin, D.E. & Caswell, M. 1993. Data Requirements for Modeling and
Evaluation of National Policies Aimed at Controlling Agricultural Sources of Nonpoint
Water Pollution. In: Russell, C. and Shogren, J.F. (eds.): Theory, Modeling and
Experience in the Management of Nonpoint-Source Pollution. Kluwer Academic
Publishers. Dordrecht.
Shortle, J.S. & Dunn, J.W. 1986. The Relative Efficiency of Agricultural Source Water
Pollution Control Policies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 68(3):688-697.
Shortle, J.S. 1990. The Allocative Efficiency Implications of Water Pollution Abatement
Cost Comparisons. Water Resources Research 26:793-797.
Shortle, J.S. 1996. Environmental Federalism and the Control of Water Pollution from US
Agriculture: Is the Current Division of Responsibilities Between National and Local
Authorities About Right? In: Braden, B., Folmer, H. & Ulen, T. (eds.): Environmental
policy with political and economic integration. Edward Elgar Publishers. Cheltenham.
Stiglitz, J. 1998. Interests, Incentives and Institutions: An Economist’s Experience of
Government Failure. Policy 14(3):10-16.
St￿lnacke, P. 1996. Nutrient Loads to the Baltic Sea. Link￿ping Studies in Art and Science
146. Link￿ping University, Link￿ping. [Dissertation.]
St￿lnacke, P., Grimvall, A., Sundblad, K. & Tonderski, A. 1999. Estimation of Riverine
Loads of Nitrogen and Phosphorus to the Baltic Sea, 1970-1993. Environmental
Monitoring and Assessment 58:173-200.
St￿lnacke, P. 2000. Variance-covariance matrix for nitrogen and phosphorus loads 1970-
1993. Jordforsk, Norge. [Mimeo.]
S￿derqvist, T. 1996. Contingent Valuation of a Less Eutrophicated Baltic Sea Beijer
International Institute of Ecological Economics,  Discussion Paper Series 128.
Stockholm.
S￿derqvist, T. 1998. Why Give up Money for the Baltic Sea? Motives for People￿s
Willingness (or Reluctance) to Pay. Environmental and Resource Economics 12: 249-
254.
Tietenberg, T. 1985. Emission Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy.
Resources for the Future, Washington D.C.
Turner, R.K, Georgiou, S., Gren, I-M., Wulff, F., Barrett, S. S￿derqvist, T., Bateman, I.J.,
Folke, C., Langaas, S., Zylicz, T., M￿ler, K-G. & Markovska, A. 1999. Managing41
nutrient fluxes and pollution in the Baltic: and interdisciplinary simulation study.
Ecological Economics 30:333-352.
Tyrrell, T. 1999. The relative influences of nitrogen and phosphorus on oceanic primary
production. Nature 400:525-530.
Van Damme, E. & Hurkens, S. 1999. Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership. Games and
Economic Behavior 28:105-129.
Van der Veeren, R. & Tol, R. 2001. Benefits of a Reallocation of Nitrate Emission
Reductions in the Rhine River Basin. Environmental and Resource Economics 18:19-41.
Wier, M. & Hasler, B. 1999. Accounting for nitrogen in Denmark ￿ a structural
decomposition analysis. Ecological Economics 30(2):317-331.
Wulff, F. 2000. Impacts of changed nutrient loads on the Baltic Sea. In: Gren, I-M., Turner,
R.K., Wulff, F. (eds.). Managing a sea ￿ the ecological economics of the Baltic.
Earthscan. London.
Xu, F., Prato, T. & Zhu, M. 1996. Effects of distribution assumptions for sediment yields
on farm returns in a chance constrained programming model. Review of Agricultural
Economics 18:53-64.
Yiridoe, E.K. & Weersink, A. 1998. Marginal Abatement Costs of Reducing Groundwater-
N Pollution with Intensive and Extensive Farm Management Choices. Agricultural and
Resource Economics Review 27(2): 169-85.